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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EXCLU-
SIONARY RULES OF EVIDENCE TO THE
PROBLEM OF PROOF
By MASON LADD*
,N the recent case of Funk v. United States' the Supreme Court
cast asile the ancient common law rule which has prevailed
so long in the federal courts, that the wife of a defendant on
trial for a criminal offense is incompetent as a witness in his
behalf. Holding that the common Jaw is flexible and adapts
itself to varying conditions in our social order, Mr. Justice
sutherland delivered the opinion of the court*-' reversing the judg-
nent of the circuit court of appeals which had affirmed a con-
viction of the defendant in the federal district court, in which the
defendant had been denied the right to call his wife as a witness on
the ground of common law incompetency In reaching its con-
clusion the court had to expressly, overrule its former decisions
in the cases of Jim Fuev Mov v. United States3 and Hendrix v.
United States' and to reject the position taken in the early case of
United States v Reid' that the federal courts in criminal case.-
were bound by the rules of evidence in force in the respective
states when the federal courts were established by the Judiciarv
Act of 1789 In support on principle of the decision are the cases
of Benson s, United States" and Rosen v United States,- the
former expanding the common law conception of competency to
include the testimony of a co-defendant in a criminal case in which
the defendants were tried separately, and the latter removing the
incompetency of one previously convicted of a felony Modern
*Professor of Law, College of Law, State University of Iowa, Iowa
City, Iowa.
1(1933) 54 Sup. Ct. 212.
2Mr. Justice Cardozo concurred in the result only. Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented without written opinion.
3(1920) 254 U. S. 189, 41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 L. Ed. 214. In the same year
the supreme court of Illinois decided in accord with this case and contrary
to the Funk Case in absence of statute. The state of facts offered greater
opportunity to reach the proper rule as announced in the Funk Case. See.
People v. Holtz. (1920) 294 Ill. 143. 128 N. E. 341.
4(1910) 219 U. S. 79. 31 Sup. Ct. 193. 5 L. Ed. 102.
5(1851) 12 How. (U.S.) 361. 13 L. Ed. 1023.
r(1892) 146 U. S. 325, 13 Sup. Ct. 60, 36 L. Ed. 991.
7(1917) 245 U. S. 467 38 Sup. Ct. 148. 62 L. Ed. 406.
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egislation in England and in most ot the states ot this country
has long ago removed the common law barriers to such testimony,
but the federal courts have been without aid of congressional
legislation in the expansion of the common law doctrine in these
cases. The opinion in the Funk Case is particularly significant,
not only because of the wisdom of the court's decision but more
so because of the court's assertion of its power and willingness to
liberalize the rules of evidence so as to accord with the growing
experience of society and its fundamentally altered conditions.
'The spirit3 of this opinion further aligns the federal courts with
the modern tendency in the field of evidence to remove barrier.,
to the admissibility of testimony and competency of witnesses inl
the desire to place before the triers of facts all relevant testimony
and to permit the reasons which formerly established exclusionary
rules now to be used to test credibility and to aid in evaluating
testimony
Whether there is a danger in opening the doors of evidence
and admitting all relevant proof, irrespective ot its possible mis-
leading characteristics, or of the likelihood ot a witness to falsify
or to be in error. depends in a large measure upon how effectivelv
the principles which established the exclusionary rules can be used
with the jury to test the admitted testimony In almost every case o
in which an incompetency under the common law or rcstriction
upon admissibility has been abolished the courts have emphasized
the use of the reasons for exclusion as a guard against an improper
acceptance or application of the evidence received." In the Benson
Case Mr Justice Brewer said,
NIn the opinion, (1933) 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 215, Mr. Justice Sutherland
stated. "The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-
if they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful de-
velopment of the truth. And, since experience is of all teachers the most
dependable. and since experience also is a continuous process, it follows
that a rule of evidence at one tine thought necessary to the ascertainment
of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever
that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old
rule. That this court and other federal courts, in this situation and by
right of their own powers. may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the
common law tinder conditions as they now exist, we think is not fairly open
to doubt."
"Best, Evidence, 12th ed., 131-132. 1 Wigiore, Evidence. 2d ed., sec.
576 5 Jones, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2127 Reagan v. United States. (1895)
157 U. S. 301. 15 Sup. Ct. 610, 39 L. Ed. 709; Firth v. Briarton, (1927) 170
Minn. 472. 212 N. W 805 Gibson v. Gray Motor Co., (1920) 147 Minn.
134, 179 N. W 729- The Iowa, Code 1931, provides in sec. 11255, "Facts
which have heretofore caused the exclusion of testimony mav still be shown
for the purpose of lessening its credibility."
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(9 the theory of the common law was to admit to the
witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the sanc-
tity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free from
any of the temptations of interest. The courts were afraid to trust
the intelligence of jurors. But the last fifty years have wrought a
great-change in these respects, and today the tendency is to enlarge
the domain of competency and to submit to the jury for their con-
sideration as to the.credibility of the witness those matters which
heretofore were ruled sufficient to justify his exclusion."' '
The courts mention but do not explain or discuss the methods
of the new use of the exclusionary principles to test weight and
credibilitv and until recently little emphasis has been placed upon
the analysis of these principles in their relationship to the prob-
lem of proof. The subject of proof and evaluation of testimony
becomes increasingly important with the new additions of admis-
sible evidence and, as Professor Wigmore has said, has been al-
most entirely neglected in the study of the law '1 The source of
this study could be varied and might not involve the exclusionary
rules at all.12 Much, however, can be derived from them, and it is
the object of this article to discuss the relationship and value of
'the principles of competency and admissibility to the solution of
the problem of proof. How may those principles be used to de-
termine questions of fact? How will the Funk Case affect federal
criminal trials, and how can the district attorney prevent the jury
from giving the testimony of the accused's wife credit beyond its
true worth Can the same principles urged to the court to ex-
clude testimonv be effectively presented to the jury to evaluate it?
Will the use of the principles which caused the court to admit the
(evidence or recognize the witness better enable the jury to appre-
ciate the affirmative value of such testimony? Except in the case
of the most artificial barriers"4 in evidence it is believed there is a
10(1892) 146 U. S. 325, 336, 13 Sup. Ct. 60, 63-64, 36 L. Ed. 9p1, 996.
"Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof, 2d ed., 3.
"-Professor Wigmore in his Principles of Judicial Proof, 2d ed., has
treated the subject of evidence as commonly known and the subject of proof
totally apart from each other. In commenting upon the method of use of
his new book, on page 6 he states, "Do not attempt to invoke mentally any
of these exclusionary rides of Admissibility commonly thought of as rules
of evidence. Keep them out of the ratiocinative process. Think of the
problem as a juror would think of it if the evidence were safely in the case
and the counsel were arguing to him about it. What we are aiming to
analyze is the actual mind-to-mind process of persuasion and belief." This
book has a real value in introducing a new type of thinking and approach
upon the problem.
"3For discussion of this problem see infra text to footnote 36.
'Professor Wigmore, in his Principles of Judicial Proof, 2d ed., p. 6.
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close relationship between proof values and principles of admis-
sibility Numerous problems taken from the law of evidence fully
illustrate this. In a great number of situations where the exclu-
sionary rules have been removed by statute or judicial decisions,
or are escaped by exceptions, the principles applied to exclude or
admit become the new sources of determining the value of the ad-
mitted testimony or the credit which a witness is entitled to receive
in judging his accuracy and veracity
THIE HEARSAY RULE AND TESTIMONIAL VALUES
Professor Thayer laid down as a preliminary precept govern-
ing the law of evidence that "unless excluded by some rule or
principle of law, all that is logically probative is admissible."'15
The probative and relevant character of offered testimony is
usually the first consideration, and if pertinent to the issues it is
submitted to the tests of the exclusionary rules. These tests may
prevent the testimony from being received in the trial, and in that
event, of course, the offered testimony has no place in the ultimate
problem of proof. On the other hand, the exclusionary rule may
have fallen into disrepute and the evidence be admitted, or there
may be an exception to it into which class the testimony falls, in
which event it performs its part in the proof problem. In tlie
case of the hearsay rule of exclusion the law prohibits the admis-
sion of hearsay testirony, but creates many exceptions into which
certain classes of hearsay may fall, and thus become a part of the
testimonial proof. It may be said that the lack of the test of
cross-examination and the fact that the party making the reported
statement was not under oath'" at the time the statement was
made are principal reasons for the rule, yet back of these is the
practical effect that the admission of hearsay would permit the
operation of too many sources of inaccuracy, fraud, and untrust-
states, "All of the artificial rules of admissibility might le abolished, yet
the principles of proof would remain so long as trials remain as the rational
attempt to seek truth in legal controversies." That there are many rules of
evidence which are artificial, founded upon fanciful grounds and should be
changed is conceded. Every teacher of evidence has his selected number
of them ready to be discarded, and some day it is hoped they will be. The
far greater number of the rules of evidence are believed to be based upon
sound reasoning directed to cause juries to investigate and determine ques-
tions of fact by rational methods rather than through passion, prejudice and
consideration of non-consequential and unreliable material. See 1 Wigmore,
Evidence, 2d ed.. p. 126-127 Compare footnote 12. supra.
15Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 265.
163 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 1362.
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worthiness. Justice Weaver, of the Iowa court, in commenting
upon hearsay states that the grounds of its exclusion, are thus,
"Its inadmissibility arises from its essential nature. Its very
name or definition presupposes somebetter testimony which ought
to be produced. Such evidence is intrinsically weak and
fails to satisfy the impartial mind. It affords a cover to fraud
and gives to the unsworn- statement of one person of matters
which are repeated by another, whose bias or failure to under-
stand or whose imperfection of memory may vitally affect its real
meaning and import, the same dgnity and quality which we give
to testimony taken under oath in a solemn judicial proceeding."'-
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are established because it is
said that this normally unsatisfactory evidence has in the particu-
lar exception qualities which enhance its trustworthiness, and
then the admission is justified upon the doctrine of necessity.
Thus the reasons for establishing the hearsay rule in the first
place, and then for creating an exception to it, are both concerned
with the probative qualities of such testimony, and it is but natural
that the same reasons are suited for the task of estimating the
worth of the testimony admitted through the exception and pro-
vide an approach to the ultimate problem of proof.
a. Dyzng Declarations.-An application of the principles of
admissibility to test the value of the testimony admitted under the
exception of dying declarations shows the close connection be-
tween the two. In a case in which B is accused of the murder
of A, C may testify to the remarks made by A concerning the
killing if made by A under circumstances bringing them within
the class of dying declarations. C's testimony is only about what
A said and is used to prove the fact stated, for example, that "B
has killed me." Is the fact stated by A and reported by C true?
The theory of the law against the admissibility of hearsay gen-
erally-has been heretofore discussed. The theory in favor of
admitting dying declarations in homicide cases is generally that
'-State v. Beeson, (1912) 155 Iowa 355, 360, 136 N. W 317, 319. Pro-
fessor Wigmore regards the risk of incorrect transmission, the intrinsic
weakness, the requirement of personal knowledge, and the idea of anonymous
utterances, all as spurious theories of the hearsay rule. 3 Wigiore, Evi-
dence, 2nd ed., sec. 1363. Although his test of lack of cross-examination is
a principal reason for the hearsay rule, the other reasons urged by the courts
give valuabie light upon the solution of the problem of proof in testing evi-
dence admitted under exceptions.
ISThe King v. Perry, [1909], 2 K. B. 697 78 L. J. K. B. 1034, State v.
Mueller, (1913) 122 Minn. 91, 141 N. W 1113, Underhill, Criminal Evi-
dence, 3rd ed., ch. 17 Brown v. Commonwealth, (1873) 73 Pa. St. 321, 13
Am. Rep. 740. See comment, (1928) 12 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 541.
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the statements, made concerning the cause and circumstances of
the killing and uttered when all hope of life has been abandoned
and the speaker believes he is soon to die, have a circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness in that with the awe of approaching
death a person would not want to die with a lie upon his lips.1"
The further reason for admission is the principle of necessity
which is requisite to all hearsay exceptions in varying degree.
Thinking of the inquiries which arise in determining the ex-
clusionary rules in terms of judging testimonial values should
show the relevancy or non-connection of one to the other. The
following questions all relate to the matters pertaining to exclu-
sion and admissibility; do they likewise point to issues concern-
ing the value of C's testimony in the ultimate problem of proof on
the issue, "Did B kill A ?"
(1) Questions arising from the general hearsay objection. Did
C have personal knowledge of the truth of the testimonial fact
asserted?9 Did C correctly understand what A in fact said?
Does C now remember the statements which A made? Can C
give an accurate report of A's statement? Will the report be
distorted by C's attitude, preconceived opinions, or bias Is there
a danger of fabrication by C because of some ulterior motive?
Can C be cross-examined as to matters which A alone personally
knew*' Was A's statement made upon oath ?20 These questions
point out the dangers of hearsay generally and the causes of its
questionable reliability Some of the reasons indicated are better
supported than others, but all emphasize the weakness of the pro-
bative character of hearsay because of its being at best second
hand testimony subject to all possible resulting imperfections.
Under varying factual situations different reasons might reflect
more clearly the particular infirmity in the hearsay testimony
offered. The result of the analysis applied in the ordinary case of
hearsay testimony would keep the testimony out altogether, but in
the event that the facts come within the exception they will be ad-
mitted. It is in case of the exception to the rule that it is believed
these reasons, in support of the general rule of exclusions, repeat
19The necessity of personal knowledge as a qualification of a witness to
testify was essential apart from the hearsay rule. Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, 18, 499. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 1364. It
also supports the hearsay rule, which excludes testimony of what another
said about a fact in issue, the witness offering the testimony having no per-
sonal knowledge of that about which he proposes to testify.
20People v. Kraft, (1896) 148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80.
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themselves as tests of the admitted evidence. The considerations
so far have dealt with the use of reasons for keeping out evidence
as discrediting the quality of evidence if admitted, now we shall
consider the use of the principles establishing the exception and
admission of hearsay as also fixing the points of inquiry in estimat-
ing the probative force or value of the testimony thus admitted.
(2) Questions involving principles authorizing admiss:on, un-
der an exception to the hearsay rule. Is A's statement trust-
worthy? Was A under oath when he made it? What circum-
stances existed at the time the statement was made which would
naturally cause A to speak the truth? Did A, when he made the
statement, realize that death was certain and soon to come? Was
A's statement made with the solemnity to be expected of one
about to die? Vas A's statement only casual and made without
appreciating the consequences of misstatement? Was it made with
the same degree of seriousness as if made upon oath in open
court? Did A have such a belief regarding the hereafter that
the apprehension of impending death would cause hin to declare
only the truth 12 Was A an irreverent person with feelings of
malice or hatred towards B so that approaching death might incite
the desire to injure B rather than express the truth 22 Was A, in
making the statement, attempting to excuse and justify his own
misconduct? Was A endeavoring to revenge himself upon those
who injured him? Was A in a position to know the truth about
that of which he spoke? Was his statement based upon personal
knowledge? Was it only his opinion founded upon collateral
matters or reasoning -?2 3 If A were alive, and the trial was for an
assault rather than his murder, would he be permitted to testify to
the fact which C says that A stated? This group of questions
raises the considerations pertinent to the determination of the ad-
missibility of dying declarations as an exception of the hearsay
rule. While the testimony offered by C may meet the tests re-
quired to admit it and thus place before the jury the statement
made by A, this does not say what will be done with the statement
in the deliberation upon the ultimate issues of the case. It may
2 State v. Rozell, (Mo. 1920) 225 S. W 931, 16 A. L. R. 400, 411. State
v. Elliott, (1877) 45 Iowa 486, Gainbrell v. State, (1908) 92 Miss. 728, 46
So. 138.22Carver v. United States, (1897) 164 U. S. 694, 17 Sup. Ct. 228, 41
L. Ed. 602.23Note, Impeaching or Discrediting Dying Declarations, 16 A. L. R.
411, State v. French, (1926) 168 Minn. 341, 210 N. W 45, The State v.
Wilks, (1919) 278 Mo. 481, 213 S. W 118.
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be that- enough elements are present to bring the statement within
the exception so as to escape the hearsay rule, but how much
weight and credit is to be given to the assertion of A? This is
the problem of proof. It is reasonable to believe that those fac-
tors which provided the escape from the exclusionary rules are
the same factors which should be emphasized to establish the
credibility of the testimony, and likewise that they single out the
points of attack to defeat the credibility along with the objections
to hearsay testimony generally If this is true, it shows that the
principles of admissibility and the problem of proof are not so far
apart and that in the study of one the student or lawyer should be
ever mindful of the other and should always be conscious of the
dual task the principles of admissibility in many cases perform.
While not fixing the form of a proof formula they determine the
substance and fundamental principles upon which any process of
reasoning must necessarily draw
b. Other Hearsay Illustrations.-A brief review of other real
or apparent exceptions to the hearsay rule, mentioning some of the
proof testing issues raised under the principles of admissibility,
shows further the dual function of the latter. The doctrine of
the admission of extrajudicial statements as res gestae calls into
play nearly all of the questions presented in respect to dying
declarations, except that lack of time to deliberate or to permit
rationalization upon the consequences of the statement before
making it is the guaranty of trustworthiness and the stimulus to
veracity 24 rather than approaching death. Whether res gestae is
admitted because it is regarded as a part of the act itself25, or be-
cause it is a spontaneous utterance 6 free from sinister motives, it
is admitted because the circumstances of the case entitle it to credit
rather than any special credit being .r.eposed in the speaker. Spon-
taneity of the statement as distinguished from a narrative of fact
or condition give the declaration testimonial recognition.27 If the
statement is used to prove the truth of the utterance, which is an
issue in the case, it comes in as an exception to the hearsay rule.
243 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., secs. 1766, 1768, 1747, 1757
25Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 521, 523.
263 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., secs. 1749, 1757
27Hedlund v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., (1913) 120 Minn. 319, 139 N. W
603, Keller v. The Town of Gilman, (1896) 93 Wis. 9, 66 N. W 800,
Morner v. Kohen, (1927) 172 Minn. 543, 216 N. W 233, Field v. North
Coast Transportation Co., (1931) 164 Wash. 123, 2 P (2d) 672, 76 A. L. R.
114, note 1121, Jones, Evidence in Civil Cases, 3rd ed., sec. 345.
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All of the general objections to hearsay testimony heretofore dis-
cussed, point out the places for testing the value of this proof.
Likewise, the reasons for admitting this testimony under the ex-
ception contain the elements which give the statement reliable pro-
bative character, and also give the clues for detecting its weakness.
Spontaneity may prevent a premeditated fabrication of testimony,
but it does not prevent an utterance from reflecting the nature, the
attitude, the subconscious bias, or other influencing forces which
might cause the declarant inaccurately or even falsely to report
facts. The spontaneity causes the utterance to be possibly as much
a reflection of the individual as it is of the facts and circumstances
causing the utterance. Some people habitually blame others for
things for which they themselves are at fault. Some people are in
the class of those who are always right and the other person wrong.
Some people, because of their experiences and associations, see
facts always in the light of these influences, and their declaration
would be in accord with them. In other instances the exclamation
may be, as the reason for the admittance of the testimony assumes.
a natural reaction stimulated by the circumstances and expressing
a true statement of facts. All of these factors and many others
considered under the principles of admissibility disclose the fac-
tors which are to determine the credibility and value of this testi-
mony
Again, in the case of declarations of pedigree or of family
history,2 8 statements of one not in court are admitted as exceptions
to the hearsay rule upon the circumstantial g-uarantee that the
natural conversations of those within a family who talk over family
affairs ante litem motam, on occasions where there is no special
reason for fabrication, are likely to be statements of the truth and
therefore admissible to prove the facts stated respecting pedigree.
Here again the basis of the exception is qualities which make for
reliability and which the party using the testimony should em-
phasize to establish belief on the part of the triers of fact of this
testimony But also the grounds of admission show the points of
attack, not only to keep the testimony out but also to weaken it i f
admitted. They suggest the possibilities of this testimony having
been made when the declarant was exposed to bias or other ele-
211 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., ch. 49.
29 Umted States v. Cotter, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1932) 60 F (2d) 689; E. T.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Tomlinson. (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1924) 296 Fed.
634, compare Radtke v. Taylor. (1922) 105 Or. 559, 210 Pac. 863.
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nents which would distort the truth. They point to the tests,
Were the "natural effusions" natural? Was the "effusion" from
relatives who had accurate means of knowledge? Was the family
gossip just gossip, or did it have a chance of reliability from the
source of the effusion?
Taking another illustration, that of regular entries and books
of account as exceptions to the hearsay rule,'2 such records are
believed to have a strong probative value, and those reasons which
permit this evidence to avoid the hearsay rule are strong factors in
giving such records high evidential respect. Questions raising these
principles demonstrate this. Does the system and habit of making
a record with regularity have a natural tendency to prevent inac-
curacies? Assuming the employee is honest, is it easier to report
what is true than what is false? Would an error in the record
entries in the regular course of business transactions be like'y to
be discovered? Would the possibility of detection act to prevent
the commission of errors? Would the risk of censure by an em-
ployer create a forceful motive in the party making the. record
not to make mistakes? Would the likelihood of detection of error
tend to prevent the temptations for dishonesty to materialize? The
result of such inquiries not only establishes a proper exception
and admission of the testimony but contains reasons which could
properly be employed in causing the triers of fact to respect the
probative value of regular entries and books of account. However,
these reasons for admission also show the lines of attack upon
their reliability Can it be said that regularity in making records
makes error impossible" Although the likelihood of discovery
may cause employees to be careful, is the case at hand not the
one in which discovery was in fact made? Is the stimulus to an
employee of not wanting to be found in error infallible in securing
accurate results? Can system and regularity prevent the possi-
bility of a daring or dishonest employee from falsifying the
records? The reasoning involved in the principles upon admis-
sibility, therefore, deals directly with the problem of proof as well.
Many other illustrations taken from the exceptions of the
hearsay rule could be used to demonstrate the point that has been
made. An analysis of this rule shows the problem of proof in
terms of admissibility and shows. that a conception of the prin-
ciples of evidence necessarily creates conceptions as to proof
values. If, as in continental Bturope, 30 we should abolish the ex-
a0See Professor Wigmore's critical comment upon handling the problem
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cltsion of this sort of testimony, it could not be claimed that the
reasons creating untrustworthiness ceased to exist, nor that hear-
say testimony at once obtained a purified quality as a probative
force. At most it could be said that objectionable testimony is to
be received for what it is worth, and the reasons formerly used to
test its admissibility would then test its value. In a similar way
the principles supporting the hearsay rule aid in determining the
reliability of the testimony admitted under exceptions, and the
reasons for the exceptions are the same reasons which both give
the admitted testimony strength and point out further elements
to measure its worth in solving the problem of proof.
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES AND TESTIMONIAL VALUES
The incompetency of witnesses to testify is based upon his-
torical developments, social considerations, and testimonial relia-
bility Many of the disqualifications of the early common law
have been eliminated or modified by statute or judicial decision,
thus permitting many persons to testify who formerly were pro-
hibited from assuming the role of witnesses in trial proceedings.
Those ideas, reasons, or principles which formerly resulted in ren-
dering the witness incompetent may, since the elimination of the
disqualification, afford tests for evaluating the testimony given by
these witnesses.
a. Disqu lificaton Because of Interest.-It was long3 ' a rule
that a person interested in the outcome of the litigation was in-
competent to testify, and even in this modern age the rule exists
in the case of the dead man's statutes which generally exclude
one interested iii the litigation from testifying as to communica-
tions or transactions with deceased persons. The same reasons
which have abolished the disqualification of parties in interest in
actions inter vivos should apply in actions against the estate of
deceased persons.32 Yet we recognize this distinction 33 apparently
of proof in continental Europe. Principles of Judicial Proof, 2nd ed., 4.
For discussion on the free proof system of Europe as opposed to Anglo-
American technical system of evidence, see Ferrari, Political Crime and
Criminal Evidence, (1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 365-80.
3lQueen v. Muscot, (1713) 10 Mod. 192, Reeves v. Symonds, (1714)
10 Mod. 291, 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., secs. 575-577
321 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 578, Chamberlain, Evidence, sec.
3670.33Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9817 The Minnesota courts Liave
given their "dead man" statute a broad interpretation and have approved
the spirit of it. Kells v. Webster, (1898) 71 Minn. 276, 73 N. W 962;
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upon the theory that if a party gets a good chance without much
chance of discovery he will fabricate, falsify, and perjure to pro-
mote his interest. Death of the adverse party is deemed to create
this chance, so that the law, in order to protect dead men's estates
from false claims, sacrifices the just claims of the living by the
iron clad prohibition against an interested person giving testimony
Archaic as the principles may seem, they do give some signifi-
cance to the connection of interest and the trustworthiness of a
witness's testimony This is, of course, recognized generally, and
the extent of the influence of interest on testimony depends upon
the witness and the case. Notably in criminal cases the interest
of the defendant in obtaining freedom has caused the concoction
of many an alibi. 34 Likewise, it is undoubtedly true that the
interest in the outcome of a civil suit has induced many an un-
scrupulous person to falsify upon the witness stand. But the
danger of interest often rests with the honest person as well, and
frequently it controls his perspective, attitude, and bias to such an
extent that his testimony may be anything but the truth. People
are prone to see their side of the story and discredit things un-
favorable. The common law regarded this so strongly and con-
sidered interest as such a stimulus to fraud, deception, and per-
jury that the interested witness was held incompetent. This dis-
qualification being abolished, except the lone relic of the dead man
statute, do the reasons which once caused a refusal to accept the
testimony now aid in evaluating it?" If the dead man statutes
were repealed, would the reasons for their existence, including the
fact that the decedent was not present to tell his side of the story,
become truth testing elements in the examination of the admitted
testimony? Does not the use of these principles in testing credi-
bility create a valid reason for repeal of the dead man statute In
the interest of the honest claims of the living?
Dougherty v. Garrick, (1931) 184 Minn. 436, 2 9 N. W 153, comment, see
(1932) 17 Iowa L. Rev. 549-52. Some courts have construed the statute
narrowly and have expressed disfavor of it. Corbett v. Kingan, (1917) 19
Ariz. 134, 166 Pac. 290; see comment, (1923) 7 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEV
414.
34The statutory abolishment of the incompetency of the accused in
criminal cases came long after the removal of the disqualification because
of interest. It was first declared in Maine in 1864. It reached England in
1889 and is universal in America with the exception of Georgia. 1 Wig-
more, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 579; Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9815.
35Interest may properly be shown to test the credibility of a witness.
Firth v. Briarton, (1927) 170 Minn. 472, 212 N. W 805, Gibson v. Gray
Motor Car Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 134, 179 N. W 729.
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b. Other Disqualificatzos.-For a variety of reasons, but per-
haps principally because of the possible- untrustworthmess of the
witness, the common law regarded one spouse incompetent to
testify for or against the other.36 Statutes have modified this dis-
qualification in many ways. Most of them now permit the hus-
band or wife to testify for each other but will not compel one to
testify against the other except in special cases." The social de-
sirability of marital tranquility and the maintenance of a happy
home life are undoubtedly the basis of the statutes.38 In those
cases in which the husband or wife does testify for the other we
have brought into play all of the ideas motivating the common law
exclusion of such witnesses. Are-the interests of the husband
and wife identical? Is the relationship between them so intimate.
are affections so strong, the problems of life which they must
undertake together so unified that a bias is created which prevents
testimonial reliability? Does fear enter into this trial picture, not
fear of an early time wife beating, but fear of the dissensions
which might arise from adverse testimony, fear of a disturbance
of home happiness, fear of losing the confidence of the other'
The effect or application of such principles is of course variable,
depending upon the persons and the kind of cases. Perhaps in
most instances the marital relation would not cause intentional
falsification, at least when the spouse may avoid testifying. This
relationship as a truth testing factor does, however, have a very
decided bearing upon perspective, attitude and bias. The consid-
erations of the matters relating to competency because of marr;age
contain about all that may be said upon credibility in solving the
problem of proof and offer a valuable contribution to it.
Turning to another previous ground of incompetency, we find
the aw expressly stating that the condition which denied the wit-
ness the right to testify is now used exclusively for the purpose of
testing credibility This is in the case of one previously convicted
of a felony 39 At the common law this disqualified the witness.
36Funk v. United States, (1933) 54 Sup. Ct. 212; Jin Fuey Moy v.
United States, (1920) 254 U. S. 189, 41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 L. Ed. 214, Hen-
drix v. United States, (1910) 219 U. S. 79, 31 Sup. Ct. 193, 55 L. Ed. 102:
People v. Holtz, (1920) 294 I1. 143, 128 N. E. 341. 5 Jones, Evidence, 2nd
ed., sec. 2128. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., secs. 601-603.
37Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9814.3SFor criticism of this doctrine, see Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Ob-
servations on the Law of Eyidence, Family Relations, (1929) 13 MINNESO-
TA LAW REVIEW 675-686. See also, Funk v. United States, (1933) 54 Sup.
Ct. 212.39Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9948. Most states have similar statutes.
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Today prev.ous convict.on of a felony is admitted expressly for
the sole purpose of testing credibility 40
Obviously, all incompetency or privilege is not based upon a
consideration of testimonial qualification. In the case of the privi-
leges of attorney-client, of doctor and patient, and of priest and
penitent, we find that the origin of the privilege has nothing to do
with the untrustworthiness of the testimony but that jt is based
upon the social desirability of protecting these respective rela-
tionships in the interest of the general good to the public.4 1 But
in many situations the principles relating to competency are so
associated with the problem of credibility that those principles
become the most important considerations in evaluating testimony
given by the witnesses once the incompetency is removed. The
effect of these considerations is difficult to estimate by any fixed
formula applicable to all cases. They are the intangible elements
but produce tangible results in creating impressions, in testing
values, and in bringing the triers of fact to a fixed conviction upon
ultimate issues presented to them.
FURTHER RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE TO
THE PROBLEM OF PROOF
There is perhaps no limit to the number of illustrations which
might be used to show that the problems of evidence ordinarilv
considered provide a background for properly placing and dealing
with the testimony in the ultimate problem of proof. After all,
this has been substantially the only training which attorneys have
had in the past, specifically relating to the problem of proof, and
it has undoubtedly been generally regarded as proper preparation
But see Rosen v. United States, (1918) 245 U. S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 62 L.
Ed. 406. As to whether the specific felony may be shown, see State v.
Friend, (1930) 210 Iowa 980, 230 N. WV 425. As to the theory of this
former incompetency, 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., secs. 519-524.
4"Testimony showing previous conviction of a felony sometimes greatly
exceeds its intended purpose of testing credibility. In the criminal case it
undoubtedly creates an impression of the probability of the defendant's guilt
as well as impeaches his veracity. If the defendant's witnesses are shown
to have been previously convicted of a felony, it may test the truth of their
testimony, but it also may tend to show that the defendant was associated
with criminals and cause the jury to infer that he was one also, In civil
cases it causes the jury to look twice when the embarrassing question has
been asked of a witness who upon direct examination may have created a
favorable impression. Yet it is quite conceivable that a previous conviction
in some cases would have nothing to do with a person's credibility.
415 Jones, Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 2156. 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd
ed., sec. 2285.
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for learning how to deal with proof. While there is room for
great progress in developing new approaches to the problem of
proof as a distinct subject, it is believed that emphasis of the
pr.nciples of admissibility in their relationship to the problem of
proof may help to fill a gap between the two. Nearly every part
of the law of evidence deals with methods of proof and to a con-
siderable degreelhas relation to the value of testimony admitted.
Other subjectsnot heretofore referred to as performing this task
are the doctrine of judicial notice, the subjects of presumptions,
inferences, prima facie case, and the burden of proof, circumstan-
tial evidence, the problem of relevancy and materiality, real evi-
dence, expert testimony, and character testimony The integra-
tion theory of the parol evidence rule is based upon evidential
intent, and the best evidence rule is founded upon the desire to
obtain the highest quality of proof available. All of these make
a contribution not only for the mechanics of obtaining the admis-
sion of such proof and methods of presenting the testimony but
also in respect to what the testimony may be counted upon to ac-
complish in the trial of the law suit. A study of the examination
of witnesses, while dealing with the methods of examination, like-
wise deals with the proof problem. For example, the reason
leading questions are objectionable is that the suggested answer
in them may not be the true answer of the witness.42  Much has
been accomplished also in respect to the science of finger prints, 43
ballistics. 4  handwriting, 45 comparative typewriting,40 psychological
tests, 47 and motion picture demonstrations. 48  These matters con-
sia~ered in the subject of evidence to determine their admissibility
and the method of use must of necessity deal with the quality of
the proof produced.
CONCLUSION
The modern tendency of the law of evidence is to be far more
liberal in the admission of testimony than in the past. Much
422 Wigmore, Evidence, 2nd ed., secs. 769-779.
4 3Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 3d ed., ch. 51.
44State v. Campbell; (1931) 213 Iowa 677, 239 N. W 715.45See valuable recent book on handwriting and typewriting comparisons,
Osborne, Questioned Documents, 2nd ed.46Supra, footnote 45.
47See recent book on use of lie detector, Larson, Lying and Its Detec-
tion. For its rejection in court, see State v. Bohner, (1933) 210 Wis. 651,
246 N. W 314, discussed in (1933) 18 MINNFSOTA LAw Ravimw 76. On
the use of psychology.in trial, Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof, 2nd
ed., McCarty, Psychology for the Lawyer.48State, for 'Use of Chima v. United R. & Elec. Co., (1932) 162 Md.
404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A. L. R. 1307
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which was previously regarded as unsafe to submit to the jury
because of the belief of their inability to evaluate it is now properly
regarded as a part of the body ot proof. Exceptions to the rules
of exclusion have become so numerous in many instances that
they have almost become the rule rather than an exception. The
statutes creating new commissions or boards performing judicial
functions, such as the workmen's compensation commission, have
frequently eliminated the restrictions upon admissibility of evi-
dence and have permitted all testimony to be introduced for what-
ever it is worth. Either by statute or judicial decision the future
is sure to eliminate further barriers of evidence. Enlarging the
scope of admissible testimony, .however, does not eliminate the
significance of the principles back of the exclusionary rules, which
were based upon what was believed to be dangerous possibilities
from the admission of such testimony The majority of these
principles will be as essential to a proper understanding of the
iaw as they have been in the past, but will be transformed from
reasons for exclusion to tests of reliability of the testimony ad-
mitted and of the credibility of witnesses permitted to testify It
is the understanding and comprehension of the principles of evi-
dence held by the bench and bar of this country which would pre-
vent a chaotic condition in the problems of proof if evidence should
become freely admitted as in continental Europe. Although, as
stated by Professor Wigmore, the principles of admissibility have
practically monopolized the study of evidence while the problem
of proof has been virtually ignored, 49 it is believed that the effect
of this study has been to create conceptions for testing evidence
offered as proof which have indirectly contributed much to an ap-
preciation of probative values and characteristics of admitted testi-
mony io
To point out the close relationship of the principles of admis-
sibility of evidence to the problem of proof and the need of a
consciousness of the dual function of the ideas dealing with ad-
missibility has been the purpose of this article. The use of evi-
40Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof, 2nd ed., 3.
50This is recognized by Professor Morgan in his very favorable review
ot Professor Wigmore's Principles of Judicial Proof, when he says, "The
M. Jordain of the bar will discover that he has been practicing un-
awares many of the principles which it enunciates." He then says, "but
even the most astute trial practitioner, unless he has made an unusually
comprehensive examination of the whole field, will be forced to admit that
he has constantly overlooked many factors of vital importance in the solu-
tion of problems of proof." (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1229.
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dence when admitted, its strength and its weakness, its association
with other testimony, its part in solving the problem of proof are
believed to be logically connected with the study of the right to
consider the testimony in the process of proof. The case of Funk
v. Umted States,5 with the development of the law preceding
it, shows the direction in which the law is moving. It also shows
the need of a wider perspective and a closer analysis of the pnn-
ciples back of the law of evidence as they relate to the use of evi-
dence in the trial after admission. The courts only say that the
principles which formerly excluded witnesses and testimony shall
hereafter be used to test weight and credibility The method52 by
which this is to be accomplished requires re-examination of the
principles of evidence as they become involved, with attention
directed to the use of the evidence in trial rather than its exclu-
sion from trial.
51(1933) 54 Sup. Ct. 212.52The result of the analysis of the principles of evidence in the prob-
-lem of proof will undoubtedly be most effectively applied in the following
ways- 1. In direct and cross-examination it should enable counsel to
bring to light more effectively and appreciably the strength and the weak-
ness of admissible testimony. 2. It should aid in the discovery of the
sources of contradictory or rebuttal testimony and illuminate the points of
attack. 3. In argument to the jury the reasons, ideas and principles urged
to the court to admit or exclude the evidence, or to hold a witness compe-
tent or disqualified, or to recognize or reject sufficiency of evidence to
make a case, are, perhaps, presented in different language, but they are
among the most forceful arguments to convince and persuade the triers of
fact in the solution of the problem of proof.
